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NEW MEXICO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMES
OF AGE
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS*
Our own constitutional law has matured and we today adopt preservation
requirements that reflect that fact.
Justice Richard Ransom'
The 1997 New Mexico Supreme Court decision in State v. Gomez2 reflects a
maturation in New Mexico's independent state constitutional rights jurisprudence.
The opinion, written by Justice Ransom for a unanimous court, can be classified as
a "teaching opinion,"3 in the sense that it provides a variety of lessons for the bench
and bar of New Mexico, as well as those around the country who are interested in
state constitutional law. The opinion provides clear, flexible guidance for both
lower courts and counsel, in the form of important substantive state constitutional
law reasoning and useful proceduralguidance for the raising of state constitutional
claims and the preservation of such claims on appeal.
Substantively, Gomez, which held that an automobile could not be searched
without a warrant unless there were exigent circumstances, built on earlier
independent state constitutional jurisprudence in New Mexico. Specifically, Justice
Ransom analogized the facts of Gomez to those in Campos v. State,4 which
prohibited warrantless arrests in the absence of exigent circumstances.
Procedurally, the Gomez court addressed the sequential methodology issue in
resolving state constitutional rights claims in areas where there are also potentially
applicable federal constitutional provisions.5 The court specifically adopted the
"interstitial" approach 6 instead of the "primacy" approach7 because:
[w]hen federal protections are extensive and well-articulated, state court
decisionmaking that eschews consideration of, or reliance on, federal doctrine
not only will often be an inefficient route to an inevitable result, but also will
lack the cogency that a reasoned reaction to the federal view could provide,

* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. This article is based on
remarks delivered by the author at the New Mexico Judicial Conclave, June 13, 1997. I would like to acknowledge
the contribution of ideas by Pam Lambert, Staff Attorney at the Institute of Public Law, University of New Mexico
School of Law.
1. State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777,786,932 P.2d 1,10 (1997). As this article went to press, Chief Justice
Gene Franchini published New Mexico Independent Adjudication, 61 ALBANY L REV. 1495 (1998), which
includes a discussion of Gomez.
2. Id. For an excellent, early analysis of Gomez, see David Henderson, Setting the Ground Rules for a
3 N.M. B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 33.
July-Aug. 1997, at 42; Part I1,
Conversation in Progress: Pal 1,3 N.M. B.J.,
3. See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy
Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1015, 1019 (1997)
(describing "teaching opinion" as "alerting the bar and bench to the possibilities of independent state constitutional
analysis and educating them in the techniques of making state constitutional arguments.").
4. 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117(1994).
5. Cf Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Lower State Courts in Adapting State Law to Changed Federal
Interpretations,67 TEMP. L REv. 1003, 1004 n.5 (1994) ("The term 'potentially applicable state constitutional
provisions' is superior to terms such as 'analogous,' 'related,' or 'parallel,' which imply a subordinate status for
the state constitution.").
6. See Williams, supra note 3, at 1018.
7. See id.
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particularly when parallel federal issues have been exhaustively discussed by the
United States Supreme Court and commentators.!
Unlike many courts which utilize the interstitial approach, however, the Gomez
court specifically rejected use of the "criteria approach": a
We decline to follow those states that require litigants to address in the trial
court specified criteria for departing from federal interpretation of the federal
counterpart. However, we note that several state courts have outlined a number
of criteria that trial counsel in New Mexico might profitably consult in framing
state constitutional arguments.1"
Gomez sets forth explicit instructions for lawyers and lower court judges with
respect to the procedural questions concerning the raising, and preservation, of state
constitutional claims in New Mexico." Specifically, Justice Ransom addressed the
problem of preservation of state constitutional claims on appeal. The state argued
that Gomez' s state constitutional claim was not preserved at trial "because of his
failure to cite to the specific cases in which Article II, Section 10 was interpreted
to provide broader protection than the Fourth Amendment."' 2 The defendant
resisted this approach:
He contends that the Court of Appeals created for state constitutional claims a
"special preservation rule" that treats the New Mexico Constitution as a "poor
cousin" of the United States Constitution. Under this special rule, arguments in
the trial court sufficed to preserve the Fourth Amendment issue but failed to
preserve the broader-protection issue. Gomez contends this frustrates the role
of New Mexico appellate courts in interpreting the state constitution and
diminishes the force of decisions interpreting the state constitution
independently. Gomez argues that the requirements for preserving a state
constitutional claim should be identical to those for preserving a federal
constitutional claim.13
Justice Ransom noted that the rules for preservation of claims had been
developed during the "lockstep" era, before the rediscovery of state constitutional
rights. 4 Recognizing that the rule concerning preservation of rights limits parties'
powers, not the courts', 5 he held that where a litigant raises a claim based on a state
constitutional provision analogous to a federal constitutional provision:

8. State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 783, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (1997) (quoting Developments in the Law-The
Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1357 (1982)).
9. See Williams, supra note 3, at 1021.
10. Gomez, 122 N.M. at 784 n.3, 932 P.2d at 8 n.3. "Under this methodology, the state supreme court, in
what seems like a teaching opinion, sets forth a list of circumstances (criteria or factors) under which it says it will
feel justified in interpreting its state constitution more broadly than the Federal Constitution." Williams, supra note
3, at 1021.
11. By contrast, courts in other states have struggled with these procedural issues for years. See Williams,
supra note 3, at 1027-28, 1028 n.71, 1037-39.
12. Gomez, 122 N.M. at 781, 932 P.2d at 5.
13. Id. at 781-82, 932 P.2d at 5-6.
14. See id. at 782, 932 P.2d at 6.
15. See id. at 782 n.2, 932 P.2d at 6 n.2.
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[Tihe requirements for preserving the claim for appellate review depend on
current New Mexico precedent construing that state constitutional provision. If
established precedent construes the provision to provide more protection than
its federal counterpart, the claim may be preserved by (1) asserting the
constitutional principle that provides the protection sought under the New
Mexico Constitution, and (2) showing the factual basis needed for the trial court
to rule on the issue. This is no more than is required of litigants asserting a right
under the federal constitution, a federal statute, a state statute, or common
law....
...However, when a party asserts a state constitutional right that has not
been interpreted differently than its federal analog, a party also must assert in
the trial court that the state constitutional provision at issue should be
interpreted more expansively than the federal counterpart and provide reasons
for interpreting the state provision differently from the federal provision. This
will enable the trial court to tailor proceedings and to effectuate an appropriate
ruling on the issue. 6
Justice Ransom explained:
The rule announced today is also a recognition of realities separating trial and
appellate practice. Although we expect trial counsel to be well-advised of state
constitutional law on a particular subject affecting his or her client's interests,
we also recognize that the arguments a trial lawyer reasonably can be expected
to articulate on an issue arising in the heat of trial are far different from what an
appellate lawyer may develop after reflection, research, and substantial briefing.
It is impractical to require trial counsel to develop the arguments, articulate
rationale, and cite authorities that may appear in an appellate brief. Here, the
record establishes unambiguously that Gomez invoked a principle recognized
under the New Mexico Constitution, the facts needed for a ruling on exigent
circumstances were developed, and the trial court made a ruling on exigent
circumstances. Therefore, the issue was preserved.' 7
One might reasonably ask what the building blocks were that led to the Gomez
decision. The decision seems to have drawn on the lessons, and is the logical
outgrowth, of the first generation of the "New Judicial Federalism," both in New
Mexico and nationally. 8 It both consolidated earlier learning and broke new
ground.
The field of criminal procedure has in many ways provided the driving force
behind the "New Judicial Federalism," as state courts have exercised the freedom
to disagree with, or at least to consider reaching a different result from, United
States Supreme Court decisions thought by many not to be sufficiently protective
of defendants' rights. As Jennifer Friesen has pointed out, it is "[n]o accident that

16. Id. at 784,932 P.2d at 8. In footnote 3 Justice Ransom rejected the criteria approach. See id. at 784 n.3,
932 P.2d at 8 n.3. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. Id. at 786, 932 P.2d at 10 (footnote omitted). Justice Ransom noted, in footnote 4, that even if the search
and seizure claim had not been properly preserved, the court could reach it because it was a fundamental right. See
id. at 786 n.4, 932 P.2d at 10 n.4.
18. For consideration of this first generation at the national level, see Robert F. Williams, Foreword:
Looking Back at the New JudicialFederalism'sFirstGeneration,30 VAL. U. L REV.xiii (1996).
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the best-publicized uses of state constitutions have been as defenses to criminal...
liability.... Appellate criminal cases applying state constitutions are plentiful, in
large part because attorneys are paid to file and brief them." 9 Further, asserting
state constitutional criminal procedure claims provides the potential opportunity to
"evade" more limited holdings of the United States Supreme Court under the federal
Constitution.20 On the other side, the prosecution must understand state
constitutional law intelligently to resist and effectively defend against reliance on
state constitutional arguments.
As early as 1976, the New Mexico Supreme Court made the following statement:
We [consider Article II, § 13 of the New Mexico Constitution] as the ultimate
arbiter of the law of New Mexico. We are not bound to give the same meaning
to the New Mexico Constitution as the United States Supreme Court places
upon the United States Constitution, even in construing provisions having
wording that is identical, or substantially so, "unless such interpretations purport
to restrict the liberties guaranteed the entire citizenry under the federal
charter."'"
This occurred a year before Justice Brennan's famous 1977 HarvardLaw Review
article22 which is generally credited as the beginning of the "New Judicial
Federalism."23 The 1976 pronouncement provides some of the underpinning for a
decision like Gomez. However, similar sentiments appeared in New Mexico law
even earlier.
In 1967, the New Mexico Supreme Court had recognized that even if a
warrantless arrest were valid under the federal Constitution, it "must still be tested
by New Mexico standards." Nevertheless, upon analysis, the court found that there
was "nothing in New Mexico cases which vitiates the validity of the arrest[.] '24
Following this, in 1975, the New Mexico Supreme Court struck down the
automobile guest statute25 as violative of state constitutional equal protection
principles.26 Additionally, in 1988, the New Mexico Supreme Court struck down the
$50,000 damage cap of the Dramshop Act.27 Although initially concluding that the
tests for equal protection analysis were essentially the same under Federal and New
Mexico constitutional law,2" the court relied on its 1975 automobile guest statute

19. Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damagesfor State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1269, 1270
(1985). See generally, BARRY LATzER, STATE CONSTrTuTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
20. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More On the New Federalism In Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. UJ.873, 873
n.2 (1975).
21. State ex rel. Sema v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 356, 552 P.2d 787, 792 (1976) (quoting People v.
Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Cal. 1975)), overruled on othergrounds by State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553
P.2d 688 (1976).
22. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L
REV. 489 (1977).
23. Williams, supra note 18, at xv.
24. State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 501,424 P.2d 782, 786 (1966), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Martinez, 94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228 (1980).
25. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-1 (Repl. Vol. 1972) (omitted from 1978 recompilation after being held
unconstitutional as noted in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-101 to -102 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) compiler's notes).
26. See McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975).
27. See Richardson v. Carnegie Ubrary Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988).
28. See id. at 1157-58.
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case, 29 and admitted that "[a]lthough we have referred to the Supreme Court's use
of the third, intermediate standard of review.., on occasion we have muddied the
constitutional waters in New Mexico by interchangeably using the rational basis and
intermediate tests as if they were identical."30 The court went on to clarify the
problem, concluding that "[t]he test might better be stated as one assuring that
classifications are based on real differences bearing a rational and proper
relationship to the classification."'" The court cited to several out-of-state cases
invalidating damage caps under state constitutions, 3 2 and concluded:
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the limitation of a full tort
recovery at issue here under Section 41-1 1-1(I) implicates a substantial and
important individual interest. For substantial and important individual interests,
we invoke an intermediate standard of review because we think it best strikes
the balance between the legislature's constitutional prerogative to deliberate
over and counterbalance the variety of interests involved in social and economic
issues, and the judiciary's constitutional responsibility to strictly scrutinize
legislation that either infringes upon fundamental rights or impacts upon suspect
classes. Viewing this constitutional balance within the separation of powers
context, which is the gist of opposition to it, we are satisfied that we neither
trample arbitrarily upon the legislature's preferred position of direct, political
accountability to the electorate, nor do we forsake our duty to protect
individuals from the deleterious effects of controversial social and economic
legislation that, in this case at least, could result in economic devastation of
innocent victims simply by the fortuitous happenstance of the tortfeasor's status.
We see no usurpation of power in a heightened scrutiny of legislation in those
limited circumstances when the class implicated is so sensitive to injustice and
the rights affected are so substantial and important that they warrant special
judicial attention.33
This reveals a sophisticated and independent approach to state constitutional
equal protection doctrine.3 These example cases illustrate that civil matters, as well
as criminal procedure, 5 can raise important state constitutional issues.3 6
This trend of independent state constitutional analysis has continued in areas
beyond equal protection concerns. For example, in 1989, the Court rejected the

29. McGeehan, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238.
30. Richardson, 107 N.M. at 694, 763 P.2d at 1159.
31. Id. at 1159 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 1160.
33. Id. at 1163.
34. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guaranteesin State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L RE,. 1195 (1985)
(criticizing use of same tests for state and federal equality guarantees).
35. See sources cited supranote 19 and accompanying text.
36. See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LrIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,

CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (2d ed. 1996). The approach has been utilized by lower courts in New Mexico to confront
the controversial question of abortion funding for poor women. See Linda M. Vanzi, Freedomat Home: State
Constitutions and Medicaid Fundingfor Abortions, 26 N.M. L REv. 433, 451-53 (1996). It remains to be seen,
however, whether New Mexico will recognize a cause of action for money damages for violations of the state
constitution, a major issue around the country. See Paul R. Owen, Reticent Revolution: Prospectsfor Damage
Suits Under the New Mexico Bill of Rights, 25 N.M. L REv. 173 (1995); FRIESEN, supra this note, at 425-37;
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at 365-74 (2d ed. 1993).
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United States Supreme Court's plurality Gates37 totality of the circumstances test
for probable cause in issuing search warrants.38 This decision, also written by
Justice Ransom, concluded that New Mexico had not experienced the problems that
led to the United States Supreme Court's change of federal constitutional doctrine.3 9
This appears to be a decision based on differing "constitutional strategies," as
described by Professor Lawrence Sager.' In addition, this decision reflects the
influence of subconstitutional decisionmaking4 ' with respect to rights, being based
partially on New Mexico court rules.42
Additionally, in 1993, in an opinion written by then Chief Justice Ransom, 43 the
court rejected the United States Supreme Court's Leon good faith exception to the
probable cause requirement for search warrants.' This opinion contained a model
Michigan v. Long45 "plain statement":
We reiterate that in. exercising our constitutional duty to interpret the organic
laws of this state, we independently analyze the New Mexico constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. In so doing, we seek
guidance from decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the
federal search and seizure provision, from the decisions of courts of our sister
states interpreting their correlative state constitutional guarantees, and from the
common law. However, when this Court cites federal opinions, or opinions from
courts of sister states, in interpreting a New Mexico constitutional provision we
do so not because we consider ourselves bound to do so by our understanding

37. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
38. See State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 216-17, 784 P.2d 30, 35-36 (1989).
39. See id at 35.
40. Pointing to the substantial role of "strategic" considerations in judicial enforcement of constitutional
norms, Sager identified the possibility of state and federal courts employing different "strategies" in constitutional
interpretation. State courts, interpreting their own constitutions, may see the need to employ different strategies,
even though they are applying similar "norms of political morality." Sager concluded:
State judges confront institutional environments and histories that vary dramatically from state
to state, and that differ, in any one state, from the homogenized, abstracted, national vision from
which the Supreme Court is forced to operate. It is natural and appropriate that in fashioning
constitutional rules the state judges' instrumental impulses and judgments differ.
In light of the substantial strategic element in the composition of constitutional rules, the
sensitivity of strategic concerns to variations in the political and social climate, the differences
in the regulatory scope of the federal and state judiciaries, the diversity of state institutions, and
the special familiarity of state judges with the actual working of those institutions, variations
among state and federal constitutional rules ought to be both expected and welcomed.
Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of
ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L REV. 959, 975-76 (1985).
41. See Judith S. Kaye, Foreword:The Common Law and State ConstitutionalLaw as Full Partnersin the
Protectionof Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS LJ. 727 (1992); WIuLAMS, supra note 36, at 194-200 (considering
subconstitutional state rights protections).
42. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at 216-17, 784 P.2d at 35-36.
43. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
44. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
45. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). A survey of over 500 decisions, however, from all 50 states, between the 1983
Long decision and the beginning of 1988, concluded that "few states have adopted a consistent, concise way of
communicating the bases for their constitutional decisions." Felicia A. Rosenfeld, Note, Fulfilling the Goals of
Michigan v. Long: The State Court Reaction, 56 FORDHAM L REv. 1041, 1068 (1988); Richard W. Westling,
Comment, Advisory Opinions and the "Constitutionally Required" Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Doctrine,63 TUL L REV. 379 (i988)(pointing out that more cases were reinstated on state grounds after Long than
before the decision).

Spring 1998]

NM STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMES OF AGE

of federal or state doctrines, but because we find the views expressed persuasive
and because we recognize the responsibility of state courts to preserve national

uniformity in development and application of fundamental rights guaranteed by
our state and federal constitutions.'

The opinion includes a deep historical analysis of both the pre-incorporation and
post-incorporation New Mexico exclusionary rule and search and seizure clause,47
further strategic" analysis evaluating the differing cost/benefit analysis at the state
and federal level, and an analysis of sibling jurisdiction decisions on the matter.49
In 1994, in another decision written by then Chief Justice Ransom, 50 the court
concluded that a "knock and announce rule" for the execution of search warrants
"advances important values,"'" and serves the interest of protecting from
unreasonable searches and seizures.52 These conclusions also reflect strategic
calculations in state constitutional decisionmaking.53 Justice Baca made a very
interesting and important argument in his special concurrence. He contended that
the "knock and announce rule" should not be elevated to constitutional status, but
rather should be left to the subconstitutional realm of common law and statutory
law. 54
Also in 1994, in still another opinion by then Chief Justice Ransom, 55 the court,
citing its earlier decisions, stated:
We recently have shown our willingness to accord defendants more protection
under our search and seizure provision than the federal courts accord under the

In light of these decisions, we must decline to adopt
Fourth Amendment ....
the blanket federal rule that all warrantless arrests of felons based on probable
cause are constitutionally permissible in public places. 6

In 1996, in an opinion by current Chief Justice Franchini,57 the court developed
a double jeopardy doctrine independent of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Oregon v. Kennedy.58

46. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 435-36, 863 P.2d at 1056-57.
47. See id. at 441-45, 863 P.2d at 1062-66.
48. See id. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1061.
49. See id at 447 n.10, 863 P.2d at 1068 n.10. The 1993 Gutierrez decision also illustrates the important
role of intermediate appeals courts in the development of state constitutional law. Specifically, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals had also rejected the Leon good faith exception even before the issue went before the New Mexico
Supreme Court. See State v. Gutierrez, 112 N.M. 774, 819 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App. 1991). This reflects the continually
growing sophistication of the Court of Appeals with respect to matters of independent state constitutional rights
adjudication. See, e.g., id.; State v. Hernandez, 122 N.M. 809, 932 P.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Diaz, 122
N.M. 384, 925 P.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Bates, 120 N.M. 457, 902 P.2d 1060 (Ct. App. 1995).
50. State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103 (1994).
51. See id. at 150, 870 P.2d at 112.
52. See id
53. See Sager, supra note 40, at 964.
54. See Attaway, 117 N.M. at 154-55, 870 P.2d at 116-17.
55. Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
56. Id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
57. State v. Breit, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 (1996).
58. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
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Concluding that the federal rule "does not adequately protect" a defendant's
double jeopardy interest, the court abandoned its earlier "lockstep" double jeopardy
doctrine that it had followed prior to Kennedy:
We have stated that our State Constitution's double-jeopardy provision "is
subject to the same construction and interpretation as its counterpart in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." That does not mean, however,
that we must embrace United States Supreme Court precedent when it changes
a standard formerly adopted by this Court. In Gutierrezwe stated that we will
"undertake independent analysis of our state constitutional guarantees when
federal law begins to encroach on the sanctity of those guarantees." This is one
of those situations.59
This approach reflects an important recognition that even though a state court has
embarked on a "lockstep" approach, that does not bind the state court in the future.'
Although the 1997 Gomez decision is a major milestone in state constitutional
law, both in New Mexico and nationally, it was not unexpected. It is clear that it
built on a series of New Mexico Supreme Court decisions expanding and refining
the scope of independent New Mexico state constitutional law.

59. Breit, 122 N.M. at 663-64, 930 P.2d at 800-801 (citations omitted).
60. As Justice Robert Utter of Washington pointed out, state courts should carefully scrutinize older cases
using federal analysis "to determine whether [their pronouncements] constitute actual holdings and, if not, whether
they were based on assumptions that are no longer valid." Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal
System: Perspectiveson State Constitutionsand the Washington Declarationof Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L
REV. 491,507 (1984).

